We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical contestants, where contestants' efforts and innate abilities generate inventions of varying qualities. The designer offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality and receives the revenue generated by the innovation. We characterize the equilibrium behavior, outcomes and payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory (where the reward is contestant-dependent) contests. We derive conditions under which the designer obtains a larger payoff when using a discriminatory contest and describe settings where these conditions are satisfied.
Introduction
Innovative activity has traditionally been rewarded mainly through the patent system.
An alternate approach to generating and rewarding innovations is to design contests that solicit proposals to solve targeted objectives (see, for instance, Scotchmer (2004) ).
A sponsor interested in technological improvement can launch a contest where agents compete by submitting prototypes, the best of which will be adopted by the sponsor. Such contests have been held to obtain innovations in various fields including mathematics, food preservation and maritime navigation. 1 Today, contests are frequently used by organizations such as the Institute for Advanced Architecture of Catalonia and HP "to promote discussion and research . . . that can help us to envisage how the city and the habitat of the 21st century will turn out." Similarly, the U.S.-based Knight Foundation has set innovation contests to elicit digital news experiments that inform and engage communities. Contests have also been suggested as a future means to address a variety of issues. For example, Newell and Wilson (2005) and Newell (2008) proposed that the U.S. Department of Energy should hold contests to resolve specific technical and scientific challenges related to greenhouse gases mitigation.
In this paper, we introduce and analyze a new model of contests with asymmetric information. We describe it as an innovation contest, although it is applicable to many settings. For example, it can be used to study procurement decisions, government contracts, research budgets and promotions.
Our framework is the following. A designer wishes to obtain an innovation that can be produced by two agents. The quality of the innovation achieved by an agent depends on his ability and the effort devoted to the task. The agents' abilities are independently drawn from the same distribution function and once an agent observes his ability he decides on his effort. Both ability and effort are an agent's private information. The designer sets up a contest whereby the highest-quality innovation receives a prize. The contest is called nondiscriminatory if the prize does not depend on the winner's identity, otherwise it is called discriminatory.
We characterize the equilibrium behavior of the two agents in a nondiscriminatory 1 Taylor (1995) analyzed the optimal contest in an environment with symmetric information where the quality of the innovation obtained by a firm is a random variable. More recently, the design of optimal contests in an R&D environment has been studied by Che and Gale (2003) .
contest for arbitrary distributions of abilities and determine the regions where the equilibrium involves positive effort levels for both agents and those where the contestants exert zero effort. The boundaries of the regions depend on the distribution function of the ability parameter and the prize.
We then consider discriminatory contests where the reward depends on the identity of the winner. We provide several properties of the equilibrium behavior for arbitrary distribution functions. The agents' equilibrium behavior in discriminatory contests again involves regions with zero and positive effort levels. The main new feature is the discontinuity in the behavior of the agent assigned the larger reward, who moves discretely from zero to a positive effort level. We provide a full characterization of the equilibrium for large classes of distribution functions, in particular for either convex or concave distribution functions.
We also study the designer's payoff in both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory contests and find conditions under which the use of a discriminatory contest increases the payoff. Discrimination dominate nondiscrimination in some set ups because it leads to an increase in the aggregate effort of the agents, thereby resulting in larger expected revenues, which more than compensate for the increase in cost. In particular, we show a class of simple examples where discrimination increases the designer's payoff. We also show that a discriminatory contest is better if the distribution of the agents' abilities is a convex function, with very low density at zero, and the designer has a high enough valuation of the quality of the innovation.
Contests in symmetric information environments have been extensively analyzed. Baye et al. (1996) studied the contestants' equilibrium behavior in standard all-pay auctions with symmetric information where agents bid for an object, all bids are paid and the highest bidder receives the object. Kaplan et al. (2003) investigated all-pay auctions where the size of the reward depends on the effort. In particular, they applied this framework to an analysis of R&D races. Che and Gale (2003) derived the equilibrium behavior and characterized the optimal research contest in an environment where each contestant submits a quality-price pair. The cost of producing the quality is sunk. The contestant offering the largest surplus, defined as the difference between quality and price, is paid the price. In scenarios where agents' valuations are private information, Amann and Leininger (1996) characterized the equilibrium bids for all-pay auctions where valuations are independently drawn from a common distribution function. Kirkegaard (2011) considered a similar setup with agents that differ in their cost of bidding and analyzed the effect of preferential treatment, that is increasing the cost of one agent, leaving the costs of the other agents intact. Krishna and Morgan (1997) analyzed the case in which the bidders' information is affiliated. Moldovanu and Sela (2001) considered an environment where an agent's type determines his cost of bidding and agents are privately informed about their type. In their model, the designer's goal is to maximize the sum of efforts by the agents.
Our model differs with respect to the literature discussed above in several ways. For one thing, the designer chooses the size of the reward and may discriminate among the contestants. Moreover, the asymmetric information is introduced in a novel and tractable way with ability and effort being perfect substitutes. In this sense, the model is suitable for the analysis of common day scenarios of competition where both innate ability and effort generate the final outcome. Singh and Wittman (2001) also analyzed a model where quality is a function of both agents' effort and type. They provided properties of the agents' equilibrium behavior and, applying the revelation principle, characterized the structure of an optimal nondiscriminatory reward structure. While the environment considered by Singh and Wittman (2001) and their results are quite general, their assumptions exclude the simpler model studied in our paper, where the revelation principle cannot be applied. Our model allows the derivation of explicit solutions for the agents' behavior. These solutions are then used to study discriminatory contests as well.
Our finding that discrimination can increase the designer's payoff runs contrary to several studies that show that it is, in general, beneficial to handicap a stronger contes-tant so as to level the field when starting from an asymmetric contest (Baye et al. (1993 Discriminating among identical agents has also been shown to be optimal in models very different from ours. In particular, Levitt (1995) and Winter (2004) found that discriminating is optimal in environments where a principal wants to provide several identical agents with incentives to carry out a task.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model. Section 3 analyzes agents' equilibrium behavior in nondiscriminatory contests and agents' behavior in discriminatory contests is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 calculates the designer's payoff as a function of the rewards and shows conditions under which it is optimal to discriminate. Section 6 concludes and proposes directions for further research.
The model
We consider the problem facing an organization that wishes to procure an innovation.
The benefits derived from this innovation depend on its quality q and are given by I(q),
There are two identical risk-neutral agents A and B who can realize the desired innovation. The quality of the innovation produced by an agent depends on his type and his choice of nonnegative effort. The agents' types represent their proficiency to develop the particular innovation. Both the types and choices of effort are private information.
Denoting the type of agent N by θ N and his effort by e N , the quality of the innovation realized by agent N is given by q N (θ N , e N ) = θ N + e N 2 .
Agents' types are independently distributed according to the same differentiable and
Types are revealed to the agents prior to their choice of effort. The quality of the innovation while observed by the designer cannot be verified. However, an independent authority can verify which innovation is best.
To procure the innovation, the organization holds a contest among the two agents.
Henceforth, we refer to the organization as the designer of the contest. The winner of the 2 Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez (2011) considered a similar set up where the agents' abilities (θ i ) are public. They characterized the equilibrium and studied the relationship between effort and type.
contest is the agent who offers the innovation of the highest quality, with ties broken by having each agent win with probability 1/2. The designer may discriminate among the agents and offer different prizes, depending on the identity of the winner. She specifies a prize R A to agent A if he wins and a prize R B to agent B were he to win, with R A ≥ R B .
A nondiscriminatory contest involves R A = R B .
Given a contest (R A , R B ), agents simultaneously choose their effort. The payoff of agent N when he chooses effort e is R N − e in case he wins the contest and −e otherwise.
The payoff to the designer is I(q M ) − R M , where M is the identity of the agent winning the contest.
The agents' strategies are denoted by two functions q A (θ), q B (θ) for A and B respectively, with q N (θ) ≥ θ, where q N (θ) indicates the choice of quality by agent N when his type is θ. Given the agents' strategies, the efforts exerted by agent N of type θ N will be
3 Agents' equilibrium strategies in nondiscriminatory contests
In this section, we provide the agents' equilibrium strategies when they compete in a nondiscriminatory contest, that is, R A = R B = R.
To formulate agent A's maximization problem, we let agent B's strategy be q B (θ), and assume it is an increasing and differentiable function. 3 Then, agent A's expected profits when he is of type θ and offers quality q ≥ θ are given by his probability of winning times the prize minus the effort; that is,
3 Due to the structure of our model, a continuous and monotone equilibrium can be replicated by one where agents' strategies are not monotonic. However, these two equilibria will be payoff equivalent;
hence, we consider only the continuous and monotone equilibria. Note that the reasoning that Amann and Leininger (1996) use to show that the equilibrium is continuous and monotone cannot be applied here because the strategy includes a choice of effort. 4 Since q B (θ) is strictly increasing, we ignore the possibility of ties as they occur with probability zero.
When q ∈ [q B (0), q B (1)], 5 and q ≥ θ, agent A's expected profits can be written as
If the level of quality q that maximizes agent A's expected profits is interior, that is, q > θ, the following first-order condition (FOC) must hold:
Similarly, the FOC for agent B in the interior case is
These FOCs yield the following system of differential equations that q A (θ) and q B (θ) must satisfy if both qualities are interior solutions:
The solution of these two equations is given by:
for some η A , η B ∈ R.
Equations (5) and (6) describe the equilibrium strategies over the range of θ's that lead to an interior solution, where efforts chosen by agents are strictly positive. However, there may be regions of parameters where agents choose corner solutions and provide zero effort, q(θ) = θ. Theorem 1 states the explicit agents' equilibrium strategies for any differentiable and atomless distribution function F (.). Prior to presenting the theorem, we outline below an intuitive explanation regarding the nature of the equilibrium strategies.
Since the equilibrium strategies are continuous, there are two types of regions for the parameter θ. We let Region I be the region where agents choose positive levels of effort, 5 If q > q B (1), then agent A's profits are R A − (q − θ) whereas they are −(q − θ) if q < q B (0). Note that offering qualities above q B (1) cannot be optimal for agent A since q = q B (1) already ensures that he wins the contest with probability one. On the other hand, q A (θ) = θ might be optimal if q B (0) > 0.
thus the equilibrium is characterized by equations (5) and (6), with η A = η B = η because, as we will show, any equilibrium is symmetric. 6 We let Region C be the one where agents choose zero effort, q A (θ) = q B (θ) = θ.
To derive the conditions that an equilibrium must satisfy, we consider the case where agents' strategies lie in Region I for θ ∈ [θ 1 , θ 2 ) and in Region C for θ ∈ [θ 2 , θ 3 ]. First, the continuity of the equilibrium strategies implies that
, for q(θ) = θ to be the optimal choice, an agent's profits for this choice cannot be lower than his profits for any q ∈ (θ, θ 3 ], i.e.,
Finally, the non-negativity of effort implies that
Equation (7) must be satisfied for any interval of parameters where the equilibrium lies in Region C, thereby implying that the function F (θ)R − θ is nonincreasing in such an interval. Equation (8) must be satisfied for any interval of parameters where the equilibrium lies in Region I. This equation requires that the value of the function F (θ)R− θ at the upper bound of the interval cannot be higher than the value at any other θ in the interval. These conditions are shown to describe an equilibrium in Theorem 1, where the boundaries of the regions are characterized as well. 7 The theorem is stated for the case F ′ (0)R − 1 < 0. After the theorem we indicate the small necessary changes to state the results for all other cases.
Theorem 1 Consider a nondiscriminatory contest with a reward R. Assume that F ′ (0)R− 1 < 0. We define recursively two finite sequences of parameter values:
(i) (α n ) n : α 1 is the first parameter such that the function F (θ)R − θ is increasing to its right; α n , for n ≥ 2, is the first parameter such that F (θ)R − θ is increasing to its right for which F (α n )R − α n < F (α n−1 )R − α n−1 . This sequence ends when the global minimum of F (θ)R − θ is reached. 6 Region I can be the union of several intervals. If this is the case, the parameter η changes from one interval to another. 7 All proofs are relegated to the appendix. (ii) (β n ) n : β 0 = 0; β n , for n ≥ 1, is the first parameter θ larger than α n that is not a local minimum for which F (β n )R − β n = F (α n )R − α n . This sequence ends when such a β fails to exist.
We denote by n the length of the longest of the two sequences (α n ) n and (β n ) n . If β n exists, we let α n+1 = 1; otherwise, β n = 1.
Then, the unique symmetric equilibrium where agents' strategies are monotonic is
The proposed strategies constitute the unique equilibrium in monotonic strategies if the set {θ ∈ [0, 1] /F ′ (θ) = 1/R} has zero measure. Figure 1 represents the equilibrium effort levels e(θ) and the function F (θ)R − θ if
When F ′ (0)R − 1 > 0, Theorem 1 still holds, and the recursive definition of the sequences (α n ) n and (β n ) n is similar, except that we start with α 1 = 0 and β 0 does not exist. Similarly, if F ′ (0)R − 1 = 0, the sequences will be the same as in Theorem 1 unless 4 Agents' equilibrium strategies in discriminatory con-
tests
We now consider discriminatory contests, where R A > R B . Formulating the agents' maximization problems in the same manner as in the nondiscriminatory case, we obtain the following FOCs for agents A and B when they exert positive efforts:
The solution of the system of differential equations is given by
As we found in our analysis of the agents' equilibrium strategies in nondiscriminatory contests, there are also regions where one or both agents put in zero effort. Furthermore, in discriminatory contests, discontinuities in an agent's strategy cannot be ruled out.
Therefore, there may exist a quality interval that is never reached by an agent even though he offers qualities below and above that interval.
We proceed by establishing several properties of the equilibrium strategies. We note first that the qualities offered must satisfy q A (1) = q B (1). Moreover, Lemma 1 rules out many possible strategy configurations in equilibrium. 
A (q) = q and q −1 B (q) does not exist, for all q ∈ (q 1 , q 2 ).
According to parts (a) and (d), if there is an interval (q 1 , q 2 ) such that q −1 A (q) < q for all q ∈ (q 1 , q 2 ), it is necessarily the case that also q −1 B (q) < q for all q ∈ (q 1 , q 2 ). A symmetric conclusion follows from parts (b) and (e). Therefore, an open interval of qualities is offered by agent A through positive effort levels if and only if it is also offered by agent B through positive effort levels. Part (c) states that the support of the qualities offered is connected. Finally, part (f) (together with parts (a) and (c)) implies that the range of qualities offered by agent B is also connected.
As in the nondiscriminatory contests, we call Region I the set of quality levels q that are reached when both agents play according to the interior solution; that is, q ∈ I if
A (q) < q and q −1 B (q) < q. Also, we call Region C the set of qualities reached when both agents put in zero effort; that is, q ∈ C if q −1
B (q) = q. The remaining region corresponds to the quality levels reached by B through zero effort, but never offered by agent A. More precisely, Region J is given by the set of qualities q such that q (b) Consider an equilibrium where there exists a (maximal) interval (q 1 , q 2 ) in Region J. Then, it must be followed by another interval (q 2 , q 3 ) in Region I.
(c) Consider an equilibrium where there exists a (maximal) interval (q 1 , q 2 ) in Region I. Then, it must be preceded by another interval (q 3 , q 1 ) in Region J.
Parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 1 imply that Regions J and I always appear together in equilibrium, with Region I following Region J. Therefore, the range of qualities in equilibrium can be split into two types of intervals, each of which belong to either Region C or Region I γ , where Region I γ is given by an interval of (lower) qualities that is never reached by agent A and an interval of (higher) qualities that is reached by both agents contributing a positive effort. We note that in discriminatory contests, Region I γ plays a similar role to Region I in nondiscriminatory contests.
So far we have demonstrated several properties of equilibrium strategies in discriminatory contests for general distribution functions. We proceed to analyze particular classes of distribution functions for which equilibrium strategies can be fully described in a simple manner.
First, we discuss the possibility of a corner solution. It is intuitive that such a solution would emerge if the prizes allocated in the contest are very small. Proposition 2 goes a step forward and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for Region C to constitute the (only) equilibrium in the contest. In such an equilibrium, both agents choose zero effort for every θ ∈ [0, 1], a strategy profile that we denote by q
Proposition 2 The strategy profile q
constitutes an equilibrium of the contest
Moreover, if the set {θ ∈ [0, 1] |F ′ (θ) = 1/R A } has zero measure, then no other equilibrium exists.
Second, it is also intuitive that high rewards would give the agents (at least agent A)
incentives to always exert a positive effort. The next proposition states that this intuition is correct, namely that in equilibrium, the qualities offered lie in Region I γ whenever the function F (θ)R A − θ is nondecreasing for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, it provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium to always lie in Region I γ where agents follow the strategy profile q
where
. 8 The qualities chosen by the agents as well as the cut-off γ in the profile q to keep the notation simple.
Proposition 3
The strategy profile q
constitutes an equilibrium of the contest (R A , R B ) if and only if the following two conditions hold:
In particular, q
When the function F (θ)R A − θ is increasing in some intervals of θ's and decreasing in others, then the equilibrium will include intervals of quality that lie in Region I γ and, often, others that lie in Region C. While a full characterization of the equilibrium strategies is cumbersome for general distribution functions, there are large families of functions that allow for quite simple characterizations. Their analysis will also provide robust intuitions on the agents' equilibrium behavior. Next, we consider two such families, namely convex and concave distribution functions.
The following theorem characterizes the structure of equilibrium strategies when the function F (.) is convex. We note that for a convex F (.), it is always the case that
To simplify the presentation of the theorem, we define the strategy
where α and γ solve
Under the strategy profile q , both agents exert zero effort up to a threshold value of θ and choose positive effort levels for higher values. Agent A's threshold is lower than agent B's, (α < γ) due to the higher reward he obtains if he wins the contest.
Finally, while agent B's strategy is continuous in the parameter θ, agent A's strategy entails a discrete jump from α to γ at his threshold.
, then an equilibrium is given by q
then an equilibrium is given by q
We point out that when R A ∈ 1,
, where we denote by p (R A ) the unique strictly positive
, we are in case (c) if R B is not "close" to R A . Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium configuration as a function of the prizes R A and R B for the class of convex distribution functions. When R A is small enough, the whole equilibrium is in Region C, and when R A is large enough, the equilibrium is in Region I γ where agent A puts in a positive effort at θ = 0 and agent B starts to exert a positive effort only for large enough θ's. The same occurs when R A is intermediate but substantially larger than R B . The intuition for these two cases is similar to that provided after Propositions 2 and 3, namely agents do not have incentives to exert any effort if the reward is low whereas competition in efforts arises if the reward is high.
When R A is intermediate and, depending on R A , not too much higher than R B , the equilibrium entails a corner solution for low values of θ and an interior solution for high values (the Region CI γ ). The reason for a positive effort being exerted at higher values of θ can be traced back to the larger density at higher values of θ due to the convexity of the distribution function F (θ). If the density is high, increasing the effort implies a large increase in the probability of winning the contest hence, a larger payoff.
We now characterize the equilibrium strategies when the function F (.) is concave, in which case F ′ (1) < 1 < F ′ (0). We define the strategy profile q
as follows:
where γ and β solve
When agents follow the strategy profile q Iγ C A , q
Iγ C B
, they exert zero effort above the same threshold value of θ. For low values of θ, they follow an interior solution where, due to the difference in reward, agent A has an incentive to exert a strictly positive effort even when θ A = 0, whereas agent B only exerts a positive effort above a certain threshold of
Theorem 3 Let F (.) be concave.
and
or both R A ∈ 1,
Note that when R A ∈ 1,
, the condition
where we denote by z (R A ) the unique strictly positive z
, we are in case (b) if R B is "small enough" or not too close to R A .
When rewards are quite low or quite high, the agents' behavior is similar to that for the convex case. For intermediate values of reward, they play according to the interior strategy profile for low levels of θ and exert zero effort for high values of θ. Notice that the corner strategy profile emerges now for high values of θ because of the low density of θ due to the concavity of the distribution function.
We remark that the propositions and theorems derived in the current section also apply to nondiscriminatory contests. However, if R A = R B the systems (15)- (16) and (17)- (18) do not have a unique solution. The equilibrium behavior in a nondiscriminatory contest when the distribution function is convex is the solution of (15)- (16) that satisfies γ = α and F ′ (α)R = 1 in the strategy profile q
. When the distribution function is concave, the equilibrium is the solution of (17)- (18) that satisfies γ = 0 and β given by the unique positive value for which F (β)R − β = 0 in the strategy profile q
Naturally, these two equilibria coincide with the contestants' equilibrium behavior in the nondiscriminatory contest identified in Theorem 1.
Designer's payoff and discrimination
In this section, we address the desirability of discrimination. First, in Proposition 4 we determine the designer's payoff as a function of the rewards and the agents' strategies. We distinguish among the four possible equilibrium strategy profiles we identified in Section 4.
We will then use Proposition 4 to derive conditions under which discrimination increases the designer's payoff. 
(b) If agents follow the strategy profile q
(c) If agents follow the strategy profile q
We now discuss the change in the designer's payoff due to discrimination separately for each strategy profile analyzed in Proposition 4. In any contest for which the agents' equilibrium strategy profile is q C A , q C B , the designer's revenue is the same, whereas the cost increases with the rewards. Therefore, such contests are dominated by the nondiscriminatory contest with R = 0. Proposition 5 addresses the other three cases.
Proposition 5 Consider a nondiscriminatory contest R A = R B = R for which an equilibrium is given by the strategy profile (q A , q B ) . . Discrimination in all the cases addressed in Proposition 5 is desirable because it elicits higher efforts on the part of the agents, which, in turn, increases revenues, thus overcoming the increase in costs. To better understand the effect of discrimination, we now examine the changes in efforts and costs following a marginal move from a nondiscriminatory to a discriminatory contest.
Consider a shift from a nondiscriminatory contest R to a discriminatory contest (R A = R+ε, R B = R−ε). The increase in cost due to this shift is a second-order effect because the infinitesimal change in the rewards is multiplied by infinitesimal changes in the probability of A winning (which went up) and B winning (which went down). Therefore, the marginal shift increases profits if it induces a first-order positive change in qualities.
To examine the change in efforts in case (a) of Proposition 5, note that agent A moves from the strategy q
. Therefore, the change in the quality offered by agent A of type θ is
. Similarly, agent B moves from q
Evaluating the sum of changes at ε = 0, and recalling that γ = 0 as well, we obtain
Taking into account that 
Summing up we obtain
This last expression has the same sign as ∂β ∂ε because β lies in the decreasing part of the function RF (θ) − θ. From (17) and (18), we find the following implicit equation for β:
∂β ∂ε evaluated at ε = 0, and taking into account that β − F (β)R = 0, is equal to following the shift to the discriminatory contest leads to (we use γ = α and
Therefore, the quality offered by both agents increases, implying that discrimination dominates nondiscrimination.
If we look at the changes induced by discrimination in the quality offered by A when agents' equilibrium behavior under a nondiscriminatory contest is q CI A , q CI B , we identify two effects. On the one hand, the slope of the function q CI A (θ) decreases because R B decreases. On the other hand, agent A has an incentive to provide a higher effort because of the increase in R A , which translates to a decrease in the cut-off value α from which on he provides a positive effort. Therefore, the interior region I (which becomes I γ ) expands.
This positive effect on the quality provided by agent A is stronger than the negative effect due to the slope of the function, which explains the increase in the quality offered by any type larger than α of agent A. Also, the more aggressive behavior by agent A translates to a more aggressive behavior by agent B. Therefore, he also increases the quality he offers at equilibrium.
Consider now the situation if the agents provide positive effort for low levels of θ, which happens in cases (a) and (c). In this situation, the parameter α can not decrease.
Therefore, the positive effect of R A on the behavior of agent A is given by the increase in the parameter γ: agent A has now an incentive to provide a strictly positive effort even for θ = 0. This incentive is stronger if agent A overbids many types of agent B that, in turn, depends on agent B's behavior. Agent B chooses low quality (for low θs) if R is low and the density of F (θ) is also low. This is the reason that explains why discrimination is preferred in cases (a) and (c) if F ′ (0)R is low, leading to the condition F ′ (0)R < 2.
While Proposition 5 shows when it is beneficial to discriminate for a given strategy profile, it fails to provide actual conditions under which a discriminatory contest dominates a nondiscriminatory one. To show that such an equilibrium profile arises in an optimal nondiscriminatory contest, we present first an illustrative example and then provide sufficient conditions in the case of a convex distribution function.
Example. Consider the case where the designer wants to achieve a minimum level of quality q. That is, any lower quality innovation yields zero revenues for the designer whereas innovations of quality q or higher yield a revenue of I > 0: I(q) = 0 for q ∈ [0, q) and I(q) = I for q ≥ q. We analyze the case where q ≤ 1. Furthermore, we assume that an agent's type is uniformly distributed, that is, F (θ) = θ.
In a nondiscriminatory contest R, the equilibrium is q if R > 1. Therefore, the designer's payoff increases under discrimination if the optimal nondiscriminatory contest implies a reward R * ∈ (1, 2).
For R > 1, easy calculations show that the designer's payoff is U (R) = I− q 2
. Therefore, discrimination dominates nondiscrimination if two conditions are met: U 2 1 3 Proposition 6 shows that when the distribution of types puts more weight on the higher types, then the designer has an incentive to discriminate if the innovation is very profitable.
Conclusion
We provided a new setting of contests with asymmetric information where innate abilities and effort combine to generate innovations of various qualities. Both the ability and effort of an agent are his private information. The designer, whose revenue depends on the quality of the bid, specifies a contest where the innovation of the highest quality is rewarded. We first analyzed strategic behavior in a nondiscriminatory contest, where the reward does not depend on the identity of the winner. We allowed for arbitrary distribution functions and determined the structure of equilibrium strategies and outcomes. The agents' strategies were continuous and the equilibrium consisted of two types of quality intervals: regions where both agents put in a positive effort and those where both agents put in zero effort.
We then analyzed strategic behavior in discriminatory contests where rewards depend on the identity of the winner. Here equilibrium strategies were more complex. The low-reward agent's strategy remained continuous, but the strategy of the higher-reward agent could be discontinuous. We provided a qualitative analysis of the structure of the equilibrium strategies for general distribution functions and a full characterization of equilibrium behavior for several classes of functions, in particular if the distribution function is either convex or concave.
We then used the equilibrium analysis to evaluate the designer's payoff. This generated conditions under which the designer prefers a discriminatory to a nondiscriminatory contest. They state that whenever an optimal nondiscriminatory contest entails a certain equilibrium behavior, it is possible to increase the designer's payoff by resorting to a discriminatory contest. To show that the results are not vacuous we provided parameterized classes of environments where discrimination is beneficial.
Our result that discrimination is desirable in a symmetric setting is quite surprising and is in sharp contrast to the intuition that when agents are asymmetric, some restrictions imposed on the stronger contestant may increase the designer's payoff. In our environment, discrimination, under some circumstances, increases the efforts generated, which more than compensates for the increase in the expected sum of the rewards awarded.
Our model can handle many familiar scenarios in addition to innovation. It can be used, for example, to analyze, lobbying activity, procurement settings, promotion competitions and even the design of sporting events. It can also be used to study contest design in the presence of asymmetric contestants and shed further light on the imposition of handicaps or favoritism.
The model can be extended in several dimensions. A dynamic version would consider two-stage contests where the winners of the first round are paired against each other in the second round. The designer's objective function may also be expanded to include explicit dependence on the agent's innate ability or on the sum of efforts exerted by both agents. Moreover, since the analysis was carried out only from the point of view of a single designer, a challenging task for further research would be to consider environments with several competing designers.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. We first show through a series of claims that q * (θ) is indeed an equilibrium.
Claim 1. The equilibrium quality is well defined, that is, q
for any n.
By construction, α n is a local minimum of the function F (θ)R − θ. β n is the first instance for which F (θ)R − θ also reaches this minimum for θ > α n and, if this minimum is never reached again, β n = 1. Hence, q
Claim 2. The equilibrium quality q * (θ) is strictly increasing in θ.
By definition, q * (θ) = θ over all intervals in C, and q * (θ) = F (θ)R+η over all intervals in I (where η is different for different intervals). Given that F (θ) is strictly increasing, q * (θ) is also strictly increasing over any interval. Moreover, by construction q
Claim 3. The profits of any agent of type θ as a function of his choice of q are constant in any interval in Region I; that is, for any q ∈ [α n , β n ] with q ≥ θ.
For any q ∈ [α n , β n ] with q ≥ θ, the agent's profits are F F −1 (
. These profits are independent of q.
Claim 4. The profits of any agent of type θ, as a function of his choice of q are decreasing in any interval in Region C, that is; for any q ∈ β n−1 , α n with q ≥ θ.
For q ∈ β n−1 , α n with q ≥ θ, the agent's profits are F (q)R − (q − θ). They are decreasing in q since F (q)R − q is decreasing in q by construction of β n−1 and α n .
Claim 5. The profits of any agent of type θ are non-increasing in his choice of q.
This follows from claims 3 and 4.
Claim 6. q * (θ) is a best response for an agent of type θ.
If q * (θ) = θ, then the only possible change in the strategy is to increase q which results, according to Claim 5, in a lower payoff,. If q * (θ) > θ, increasing q is also non-profitable.
Moreover, any decrease in q for which the effort is still non-negative implies that the agent stays within the same region (recall that effort is zero in the left boundary of the region).
Hence, according to Claim 3, profits remain the same, .
Claims 1 to 6 show that q * (θ) is an equilibrium of the nondiscriminatory contest.
We now prove that q * (θ) is the unique symmetric equilibrium in the class of continuous and monotonic strategies. We again proceed through a series of claims. Note first that by continuity of any equilibrium strategy q(θ), the interval [0, 1] can be divided into a finite sequence of intervals over which q(θ) alternates between interior and corner solutions.
Consider any symmetric equilibrium q(θ).
The expected payoff of an agent of type θ o when he chooses q (θ o ) = θ o is equal to F (θ o )R, which must not be less than F (θ oo )R − (θ oo − θ o ) which corresponds to his expected payoff if he offers quality θ oo . Therefore, we obtain
where q(θ) is an interior solution. Then,
Moreover, either θ oo = 1 or θ oo is the first parameter which is not a local minimum of the function F (θ)R − θ that
The property that q(θ) = F (θ)R + η follows from the FOCs characterizing an interior equilibrium. To show that η = θ o − F (θ o ) R we distinguish between two cases.
(1) If θ o > 0, then there exists an interval in Region C just to the left of θ o . By continuity of q(θ), it must be the case that q(θ 0 ) = θ 0 which implies that
(2) If θ o = 0, the probability of winning is zero because the quality offered is strictly increasing in θ. Hence, it cannot be that in equilibrium both agents choose q(0) > 0, since it would lead to a negative payoff. Therefore, F (0)R + η = 0, i.e., η = 0 and
R holds in this case as well.
Also, by continuity, if θ oo < 1, it must be the case that F (θ oo )R + η = θ oo ; that is,
Finally, suppose by way of contradiction, that θ oo > θ, where θ is the first parameter which is not a local minimum of the function
(θ) is an interior solution in an interval
θ, θ where F (θ)R − θ is a decreasing function. However, this is not possible because for
F (θ)R − θ is decreasing in this interval.
Claim 9. In a maximal interval [θ o , θ oo ] where q(θ) = θ, either θ oo = 1 or θ oo is the first parameter such that the function F (θ)R − θ is increasing to its right of.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that θ oo is such that the function F (θ)R − θ is not increasing to its right. Hence, F (θ)R − θ is not increasing in an interval θ oo , θ for some
Recall that by maximality of the interval [θ o , θ oo ] it must be the case that q(θ) > θ for θ ∈ θ oo , θ with θ < θ. Hence,
for θ ∈ θ oo , θ . But this cannot happen if F (θ)R − θ is not increasing. Furthermore, by claim 7, θ oo must be the first parameter where this happens after θ o .
Therefore, q * (θ) is the unique symmetric equilibrium, given that it is the only candidate compatible with claims 7 to 9. 
Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists an interval (q o , q oo ) such that q −1
. Therefore, the following FOC is necessarily satisfied:
B (θ))R − 1 = 0. However, this is not possible for an interval q
provided the set {θ ∈ [0, 1] /F ′ (θ) = 1/R} has zero measure.
Consider now an equilibrium (q A (θ), q B (θ)). Given Claim 10, the continuity of the any equilibrium strategy q i (θ) and the fact that q i (θ) must be strictly increasing, it is possible to divide the interval [0, 1] into a series of intervals. In some of the intervals, both agents choose the corner solution q i (θ) = θ for both i = A, B; hence, the equilibrium is symmetric in those intervals. In the other intervals, both agents choose an interior solution. Therefore, their behavior is necessarily described by equations (5) and (6) . The equilibrium is indeed symmetric if we prove that, over any of these intervals, the constants η A and η B coincide. Denote by θ o the lower bound of one such interval. By continuity,
This shows that η A = η B and concludes the proof that any equilibrium in monotonic strategies is necessarily symmetric.
Proof of Lemma 1. We prove the six properties by way of contradiction.
(a) If such an interval (q 1 , q 2 ) exists, then agent A of type θ ∈ (q −1
A (q 2 )) can increase his payoff by lowering the quality offered to another q ′ < q(θ) such q ′ ≥ max {q 1 , θ}. This change reduces the cost and does not affect his probability of winning the contest.
(b) The proof is similar to the proof of (a).
(c) If such an interval (q 1 , q 2 ) exists, let q 3 = {inf q | q > q 2 and q = q i (θ) for some
If it is the case that q 3 is offered, that is, q A (θ) = q 3 for some θ ∈ [0, 1] (we take agent A to be the one offering q 3 without loss of generality), then θ < q 3
(it is certainly true if q 2 > 1, and if q 2 ≤ 1 it is true since the equilibrium strategies are monotonic) and agent A of type θ can increase his payoff by lowering the quality offered to another q ′ > θ in the interval (q 1 , q 2 ) because this change does not affect his probability of winning the contest. By continuity, a similar argument goes through if q 3 is not reached. (f) Consider the maximal last interval (q 1 , q 2 ) of this type. Since q B (θ) ≥ q 2 for every θ ∈ (q 1 , q 2 ) and there cannot be a mass point, it must be the case that q 2 < 1. Moreover, we claim that agent B must be offering quality levels arbitrarily close to q 2 . Indeed, if this were not the case, the maximality of (q 1 , q 2 ) implies that agent A is either reaching qualities just above q 2 by putting in positive effort or he is not reaching these qualities.
The first possibility is ruled out by part (a) while the second is ruled out by part (c) of the lemma. Note that these qualities arbitrarily close to q 2 must be offered through positive effort levels by agent B since they are offered by types θ < q 2 .
Given parts (b) and (e), it is necessarily the case that if B puts in positive effort to reach a certain interval (q 2 , q 3 ), A also puts in positive effort to reach this interval.
Consider now the largest such q 3 , we show that θ A3 ≡ q −1
B (q 2 ) ≡ θ B2 (we assume for convenience that both q 2 and q 3 are reached, otherwise we can make a limiting argument). Given that the qualities offered in an interior equilibrium are given by q A (θ) = F (θ)R B + η A and q B (θ) = F (θ)R A + η B ,
e., θ A3 > θ B3 as we wanted to show.
Therefore, there still exists another interval (q 3 , q 4 ) above (q 2 , q 3 ) where agents bid. Given that agent B is putting in positive effort to reach q 3 , he cannot, since there are no atoms, switch to a region of qualities that are reached by him through zero effort. Therefore, in the new interval it is again the case that B does not offer any quality in it while A puts in zero effort. This is the type of region we started with, in contradiction to the assumption that it is the last region of this kind. Hence, such a region cannot exist in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) It follows from Lemma 1.
(b) Consider the maximal interval (q 1 , q 2 ) in Region J. We notice that q −1 A (q 2 ) ≤ q 1 < 1. Therefore, there are types of agent A (higher than q 1 ) that offer qualities above Region J. In this new interval just above J, agent A puts in strictly positive effort. Thus, it must be the case (according to Lemma 1) that agent B also puts in positive effort; that is, this new interval belongs to Region I.
(c) Consider the maximal interval (q 1 , q 2 ) in Region I. We prove this part if we show that the interval can not be preceded by an interval in Region C and that it can not be the initial interval. Suppose by contradiction that either q 1 = 0 or that (q 1 , q 2 ) is preceded by a interval in Region C. In both cases, q A (q 1 ) = q B (q 1 ) = q 1 . Given the equilibrium strategies in an interior region, q A (θ) = F (θ)R B +q 1 − F (q 1 )R B and q B (θ) = F (θ)R A +q 1 − F (q 1 )R A for any θ ∈ (q 1 , q 2 ). Therefore, q A (θ) < q B (θ) for any θ ∈ (q 1 , q 2 ) , which implies that
A (q)). In particular, there must be an interval of qualities reached above q 2 and q −1 B (q 2 ) < q 2 . Therefore, in the interval of qualities just above q 2 , agent B exerts positive effort, which must be matched by agent A also offering positive effort, contradicting the maximality of (q 1 , q 2 ) in Region I.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first prove a claim that will be used in the current proof as well as in several proofs in Section 5.
Claim 11. Suppose that agent i, for i = A, B, chooses q i (θ) = θ for all θ ∈ (θ o , θ oo ) and that the function F (θ)R j − θ, for j = i, is non-increasing in θ for θ ∈ (θ o , θ oo ). Then, the payoff of agent j of type θ j is non-increasing in the quality offered q, for q ∈ (θ o , θ oo ) with
The proof of Claim 11 follows from the fact that Therefore, the function
Finally, suppose by contradiction that there exists another equilibrium. It must either start with an interval in Region I γ or with an interval in Region C followed by an interval in Region I γ . Therefore, there is a jump, that is, there exist two values q 1 and q 2 (where
If the inequality is strict, then this contradicts the fact that the function F (θ)R A − θ is non-increasing in θ.
If this an equality, then F (θ)R
, which contradicts the property that the set {θ ∈ [0, 1] |F ′ (θ) = 1/R A } has zero measure.
Proof of Proposition 3. We show first that q
Second, we prove a claim that will be useful at several proofs:
Then, the payoff of agent j of type θ j is constant and equal to
Given q i (θ), the payoff of agent j of type θ j when he offers
Third, from Claim 12 and given agent B's strategy, the payoff of agent A of type θ when he offers any quality q ∈ [γ, q B (1)] with q ≥ θ is θ − γ + F (γ)R A . Similarly, the payoff of agent B of type θ when he offers quality q ∈ [γ, q B (1)] with q ≥ θ is θ − γ, also independent of q. In particular, the strategies suggested are best responses one to the other for agents of type θ ∈ [γ, 1]. Agent B's payoff when offering quality q(θ) = θ for θ ∈ [0, γ] is zero. His payoff would be negative if he were to offer any q ∈ (θ, γ] since he still has a probability zero of winning and it would be θ − γ < 0 if he were to offer any q ∈ (γ, q B (1)]. Therefore, agent B's strategy is a best response for all θ ∈ [0, γ) as well. Agent A's payoff when following the strategy suggested for θ ∈ [0, γ) is θ−γ +F (γ)R A .
As shown above, his payoff is the same for any q ≥ γ. If he offers q ∈ [θ, γ), then his payoff is F (q)R A − (q − θ). Hence, agent A's proposed strategy is his best response if
which is implied by (13) .
Finally, we prove that conditions (13) and (14) are necessary for q
to be an
can not be an equilibrium because q Iγ B (θ) would not be well defined (q Therefore, the proof of this part follows from Proposition 2.
(b) First, we show that α and γ are well defined in this region and that γ > α.
Equation (15) defines a function γ 1 (α) which is increasing and such that γ 1 (1) = 1 and
. Equation (16), together with the condition that γ ≥ α defines another function γ 2 (α) . γ 2 (α) is defined only for values of α where the function F (θ) R A − θ is non-increasing, but not necessarily for all of them. Note that
is defined for all such values when R A ≥ 1; furthermore, it is certainly defined for values of α close enough to the minimum of the function F (θ) R A − θ, which we denote θ min . Also note that γ 2 (α) always lies in the increasing part of F (θ) R A − θ. The function γ 2 (α) is strictly decreasing and converges to θ min when α converges to θ min . We distinguish between two cases.
, 1 , then F (1) R A − 1 < 0 Therefore, there is some α o for which γ 2 (α o ) = 1, from which on the function is strictly decreasing until it reaches θ min , where
, then a solution to the system of equations always exists.
, then the function γ 2 (α) is defined for α ∈ [0, θ min ) and it takes values always lower than 1. In this case, given that γ 2 (α) is decreasing and γ 1 (α) is increasing, a solution exists if and only if γ
which we write as,
Second, we show that agents' strategies are well defined, that is, the functions
This trivially holds for all regions where players choose zero effort.
, we note that both φ A (θ) and φ B (θ) are convex functions. Furthermore,
Third, we prove that each agent's strategy is best response to each other.
Given agent B's strategy, the payoff of agent A of type θ when he offers quality q ∈ [γ, q B (1)] with q ≥ θ is (see Claim 12) θ − γ + F (γ)R A , which is independent of q.
Similarly, the payoff of agent B of type θ when offering quality q ∈ [γ, q B (1)] with q ≥ θ is θ − γ + F (α)R B , also independent of q. This implies, in particular, that the strategies suggested are best responses one to the other for agents of type θ ∈ [γ, 1].
The payoff of agent B of type θ ∈ (α, γ) is decreasing in q for q ∈ (θ, γ), because no type of agent A chooses qualities in (α, γ) and the payoff is constant for q ∈ [γ, q B (1)].
Therefore, q CIγ B (θ) = θ is a best response for all θ ∈ (α, γ). The payoff of agent B of type θ ∈ [0, α) is decreasing in q for q ∈ [θ, α) because the interval [θ, α) is in the decreasing part of the function F (θ)R A − θ (see Claim 11) . Therefore, q CIγ B (θ) = θ is a best response because we also know that it is first decreasing and then constant for q ∈ [α, q B (1)].
Agent A of type θ that chooses q ∈ [0, γ) , with q ≥ θ, obtains a payoff of F (q)R A −q+θ.
The function F (q)R A − q is decreasing until α, then it further decreases, then increases until it recovers the same value F (α)R A − α at γ (see (16) ). As we saw above, A's payoff is constant for q ∈ [γ, q B (1)]. Therefore, q CIγ A (θ) = θ is a best response for all θ ∈ [0, α) and q CIγ A (θ) = F (θ)R B + γ − F (α)R B is a best response for all θ ∈ [α, γ). (c) Given the convexity of F (θ), the function F (θ)R A − θ is always increasing when
. Moreover, given the definition of γ, when R A ∈ 1,
or R A − R B > γ, which is equivalent to F (γ) R A − γ > 0. Given that, in this region, F (θ)R A −θ is first decreasing and then decreasing, F (γ) R A −γ > 0 is a sufficient condition for equations (13) and (14) to hold. Therefore, part (c) holds due to Proposition 3. Equation (17) defines a function γ 1 (β). The function is increasing at least for β ≥ θ max because F (θ) R A − θ is decreasing for θ ≥ θ max and R A > R B . Moreover,
We distinguish between two cases. When β 2 (0) is well defined, that is, when R A − 1 ≤ 0 then, since R B < R A , γ 1 (1) = 1 − R B is positive. Therefore, the functions γ 1 (β) and β 2 (γ) intersect and a solution to equations (17) and (18) exists. When R A ∈ 1,
, then F (1) R A − 1 ≤ 0, therefore there is some γ for which β 2 (γ) = 1. We denote this value by z(R A ). The necessary and sufficient condition for (17) and (18) to intersect is
Second, we show that the functions δ A (θ) ≡ q For θ ∈ [γ, β), we have F (θ)R A − θ ≥ F (γ)R A − γ because γ lies in the increasing part of F (θ)R A − θ and the function takes the same value for γ and β. Hence, δ B (θ) =
because it is a concave function of θ, δ(0) = γ > 0 and δ (β) = 0 by equation (17) .
Given agent B's strategy, the payoff of agent A of type θ ∈ [β, 1] is decreasing in q for q > θ because the function F (q)R A − q is decreasing (see Claim 11); thus q because, due to the concavity of F (θ)R A −θ, the function F (θ)R A −θ is always increasing.
, then conditions (13) and (14) hold (given the concavity of F (θ)R A − θ) if and only if F (γ)R A − γ ≤ R A − 1 which, given that F (γ)R A = R A − R B by definition of γ, is equivalent to γ ≥ 1 − R B . We rewrite the inequality as
, which is the condition we require in (c).
Proof of Proposition 4. (a) If agents follow q C
A , q C B , the quality q that wins the contest is the max {θ A , θ B }. Therefore, the distribution of q is F * (q) = F (q) 2 and
The expression for U (R A , R B ) provided in the proposition follows immediately from the fact that either agent wins the contest with probability 
Therefore, the designer's expected income is the first part of the expression U (R A , R B ).
The expected cost depends on the probability that either agent wins the contest. An agent A of type θ wins the contest with probability
It follows that the probability that agent A wins the contest is
while the probability that B wins the contest is
. Therefore, the designer's expected
, from which the second part of the expression
is obtained.
(c) If agents follow q
, the set of qualities that is reached is [0,
and the expression for the designer's income follows. Concerning the probability that either agent wins the contest, agent A of type θ ∈ [0, α) wins with probability F (θ)
whereas, if his type is θ ∈ [α, 1] , he wins with probability
Therefore, the probability that A wins the contest is
and the designer's expected cost is
which corresponds to the last term of U (R A , R B ) in part (c) of the proposition. , the space of qualities that is
For q ∈ [β, 1], dF * (q) = 2F (q)F ′ (q)dq. Therefore, the expression for the designer's income follows. We compute now the probability that agent A wins the contest. If his type is θ ∈ [0, β), he wins with probability
Moreover, agent A with type θ ∈ [β, 1] wins with probability F (θ). Therefore, the probability that A wins the contest is
(where the last equality is derived from the two equations that define γ and β) and the designer's expected costs are 
∂U ∂R
In particular, when R A = R B = R, then γ = 0 and
Similarly,
Therefore,
Consider now a nondiscriminatory contest R. If we marginally increase R A and simultaneously marginally decrease R B , then the total effect is
The integral R 0 I(q)dq − I(R)R < 0 because I(q) is an increasing function. Therefore, 
.
When we evaluate these derivatives at R A = R B = R, we obtain
and the result follows.
(b) We proceed as in part (a).
When R A = R B = R, then γ = α and α satisfies F ′ (α)R = 1. Therefore,
The derivative of the designer's payoff with respect to R B is To compute the partial derivatives of α and γ, we use equations (15) and (16) , where
Both ∆ and Ω depend on (R A , R B ) and we need to compute Ω ∆ at (R A = R, R B = R) .
We note that Ω (R A = R, R B = R) = 0 and ∆ (R A = R, R B = R) = 0. We use that (R A , R B ) .
∂Ω ∂R
which, taking into account that γ = α and F ′ (α) = 1 R when R A = R B = R, implies
hence, ∂∆ ∂R B (R A = R, R B = R) = F ′′ (α) R ∂γ ∂R B − ∂α ∂R B .
We notice that γ > α as soon as R A > R B , which implies that given that I(q) is increasing. Therefore, discriminating marginally always increases the designer's payoff.
(c) Proceeding as in the previous cases, the marginal change in costs due to marginal discrimination is zero. Therefore, it is enough to examine the change in revenues. Rather than proceeding directly through the designer's revenue function, we continue the line of argument that we presented after Proposition 5. We show that if the optimal R satisfies R > 1 F ′ (1) . To show that this is the case if v is large enough, we compare the profits that the designer obtains by choosing an R ≥ 1 F ′ (1) with those obtained for R = 0 (R = 0 is the optimal choice among all the rewards that lead to the equilibrium profile of q and R B = R − ε, the inequality is equivalent to (R + ε) F (2ε) − 2ε < 0. The inequality holds for ε small enough because F ′ (0) = 0.
